Published Appellate Court Opinions

In this case the court is asked to answer three questions:  first, whether a governmental body, serving as a Redevelopment Agency, is obligated to apply electric vehicle ("EV") parking credits, as required under N.J.S.A. 40:55D-66.20 ("the EV statute"), when determining a concept plan's consistency with a redevelopment plan adopted pursuant to the Local Redevelopment and Housing Law ("LRHL") (N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-1 to -89); second, under section (f) of the EV statute, when applying EV credits, how the credits are to be rounded up; and last, whether a rounded-up EV credit may reduce the total required parking by more than the ten percent limit set forth under section (e) of the EV statute.

The court held that EV credits are to be applied when determining a concept plan's consistency with a redevelopment plan.  Otherwise, a plan that was confirmed as consistent by the Borough would not be the same as the one to be potentially approved at time of preliminary site plan approval.  The court also concluded that when applying EV credits to the total number of calculated spaces and that number includes any decimal, based on the plain language of the statute, the calculation must be rounded up to the next whole parking spot.  However, also based on the plain language of the statute, the court rejected the contention that a rounded-up EV credit can reduce the total required parking by more than the ten percent limit set forth under section (e) of the EV statute, which is more specific than section (f) and therefore controls.

Applying these principles, the court affirmed the Law Division's denial of plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and grant of defendant's cross-motion for summary judgment.

Plaintiff, a tenured professor, was fired after a university received a series of student complaints.  The university issued charges against plaintiff and conducted dismissal proceedings pursuant to its faculty handbook, a document which, among other things, detailed the process for removing a tenured professor.  The university's board of trustees found by clear and convincing evidence that plaintiff had engaged in willful misconduct and terminated his employment.

Plaintiff filed suit, alleging the board failed to establish adequate cause for termination by clear and convincing evidence.  The trial court granted the board's motion for summary judgment, finding the board was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable in its decision to terminate plaintiff in accordance with the agreed-upon guidelines established in the faculty handbook.

After a de novo review of the trial court's summary judgment order, the court affirmed, holding that the administrative agency standard of review used to analyze the internal decision-making of public universities applied to a private university's termination of a tenured professor.

In this medical malpractice action, the court granted defendant Perry Loesberg, M.D. leave to appeal Law Division's order's denying his motions to dismiss plaintiff's amended complaint due to their failure to serve an affidavit of merit (AOM) within 120 days of the filing of defendant's answer in accordance with N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-27.  The court affirms, concluding the orders were supported by the record because there were extraordinary circumstances warranting an extension of the AOM 120-day filing deadline. 

Prior to defendant being named in the amended complaint, a court order granted plaintiff's motion to waive the filing of an AOM as to the then-named defendants.  The lack of a Ferreira conference after defendant answered the amended complaint, coupled with the prior court order and defendant's discovery response failure to raise the lack of an AOM as a defense, constituted "an almost perfect storm" of events that warrant affording plaintiff additional time to submit an AOM.  See A.T. v. Cohen, 231 N.J. 337, 350 (2017).  A Ferreira conference should have been conducted to bring the parties together to address the applicability of the AOM waiver order on the claims against the newly-added defendant.  Permitting plaintiff to file an AOM outside the 120-day statutory deadline and denying defendant's motions to dismiss prevents an injustice.

In this appeal, as an issue of first impression, the court was asked to consider whether N.J.S.A. 43:21-19(i)(10)— from the time of its enactment in 2010—provided an exemption for court reporters under the Unemployment Compensation Law ("UCL"), N.J.S.A. 43:21-1 to -71, or whether court reporters must still establish a Federal Unemployment Tax Act ("FUTA") exemption pursuant N.J.S.A. 43:21-19(i)(1)(G).  The court determined N.J.S.A. 43:21-19(i)(10) does provide such an exemption and there is no requirement for court reporters to establish a FUTA exemption.

The court noted the express language of N.J.S.A. 43:21-19(i)(10) provides that services performed by court reporters "shall not be deemed to be employment subject" to the UCL.  The court presumed the Legislature understood the implications of removing court reporters from N.J.S.A. 43:21-19(i)(7)(Y) and the corresponding FUTA mandate and placing the amendment in a different section.  The DOL asserted there were no scenarios in which the new statute, N.J.S.A. 43:21-19(i)(10), would apply to court reporters in a manner distinct from the operation of the prior exemption under N.J.S.A. 43:21-19(i)(7)(Y).  The court rejected that interpretation, which would have rendered N.J.S.A. 43:21-19(i)(10) meaningless because the amended statute must be read in harmony with N.J.S.A. 43:21-19(i)(7)(Y) and the rest of the statute.  The court further determined the Legislature was fully aware of the prior requirement for court reporters to establish a FUTA exemption under N.J.S.A. 43:21-19(i)(7)(Y), which is why it amended the statute to remove the requirement for a FUTA exemption under N.J.S.A. 43:21-19(i)(10).

The court noted that although a sensible reading of N.J.S.A. 43:21-19(i)(10) provides an exemption for court reporters, to the extent the statutory language resulted in more than one reasonable interpretation, the legislative history unequivocally established the Legislature intended to dispense with the requirement to establish a FUTA exemption.  Accordingly, the court reversed the Commissioner's holding with respect to the applicability of N.J.S.A. 43:21-19(i)(10) and concluded petitioners are exempt from the time of the enactment of the statute in 2010.

         The court granted defendant leave to appeal from two orders entered by the Family Part, which denied a motion to amend his answer to include a counterclaim for divorce and his subsequent motion for reconsideration.  On appeal, the court reversed both orders.

          The court concluded defendant should have been permitted to amend to include a counterclaim because discovery was not concluded, there was no trial date, and the interest of justice required it.  The proposed counterclaim alleged defendant learned of conduct between plaintiff and a third party, which constituted grounds for divorce based on irreconcilable differences and extreme cruelty.  Moreover, based on defendant's proposed pleading and extant business litigation in the Law Division involving the parties and the third party, the case appeared to be complex in that defendant's counterclaim sounded in claims against plaintiff for:  dissipation, marital fault, and bad faith.

         Plaintiff argued to the trial court and on appeal that Rule 5:4-2(e) barred defendant's ability to amend the answer to include incidents that occurred during the marriage because defendant knew about the claims and failed to file a counterclaim with his initial answer.  The court concluded Rule 5:4-2(e) was inapplicable because it applies when a party seeks to amend an already existing counterclaim.  Moreover, the court harmonized Rule 5:4-2(d) and (e) with Rule 4:9-1 and held the amendment of Family Part pleadings are subject to the liberal interest of justice standard in Rule 4:9-1, and courts should permit a party to amend where the request is timely, and not futile, frivolous, or harassing. 

In this appeal, the court held that the rule announced in State v. Smith, 251 N.J. 244, 253 (2022), that "reasonable and articulable suspicion of a tinted windows violation arises only when a vehicle's front windshield or front side windows are so darkly tinted that police cannot clearly see people or articles within the car," should be afforded pipeline retroactivity.  The court also determined a defendant who had not filed a notice of appeal when a retroactive decision was issued, but was subsequently granted leave to file as within time under Rule 2:4-4 and State v. Molina, 187 N.J. 531, 535-36 (2006), is deemed within the "pipeline" for retroactivity purposes.

In this appeal, the court considered whether a Remediation in Progress waiver (RIP waiver) issued by the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (NJDEP) conveys a property interest to the recipient that is constitutionally protected by the right to due process.  The court concluded it does not.

The owner or operator of an industrial establishment is subject to the Industrial Site Recovery Act (ISRA) when they cease operations or transfer ownership or operation of the industrial establishment.  N.J.S.A. 13:1K-9(a).  Before doing so, the ISRA requires the owner or operator of an industrial establishment to remediate its industrial establishment and obtain a final remediation document.  N.J.S.A. 13:1K-9(b).  To expedite transfers and cessations of contaminated industrial sites, the ISRA permits alternatives to obtaining a final remediation document prior to the cessation of operations or transfer of property, including an RIP waiver.  N.J.A.C. 7:26B‑5.4.  An RIP waiver allows the owner or operator of an industrial establishment to apply to NJDEP to close or transfer ownership or operations, provided that the industrial establishment is already in the process of remediation and specific requirements are met.  N.J.S.A. 13:1K‑11.5; N.J.A.C. 7:26B-5.4.

An RIP waiver is contingent on remediation being in progress; if remediation falls out of compliance, the RIP waiver applicant no longer qualifies for the suspension under N.J.S.A. 13:1K-11.5, and NJDEP may rescind the RIP waiver.

Clarios, LLC, appealed from a decision by NJDEP to deny its request for an adjudicatory hearing concerning NJDEP's decision to rescind Clarios's RIP waiver for the premises at issue, 760 Jersey Avenue, New Brunswick.  Clarios argued NJDEP's grant of the RIP waiver in 2007 created a property interest protected by a right to due process in that the RIP waiver operates like a license—well-recognized to be in the nature of a property right—that permits the receiving party to conduct certain activities and exempts it from obligations subject to the State's stipulations.

The court rejected Clarios's assertion.  The only benefit conferred by the RIP waiver is that the owner or operator may effect such close of operations or transfer of ownership prior to "obtaining departmental approval of a remedial action workplan or a negative declaration or without the approval of a remediation agreement."  N.J.S.A. 13:1K‑11.5(a).  The RIP waiver does not suspend the need to remediate the industrial establishment.  It waives only the requirement to provide for remediation before the close of operations or the transfer of ownership.  In addition, the regulation that provides for the issuance of RIP waivers explicitly limits the authority of the waiver to relieve the recipient of "the obligations to remediate the industrial establishment pursuant to ISRA . . . and any other applicable law."  N.J.A.C. 7:26B-1.8(b).

          In this appeal, as an issue of first impression, the court addresses whether a New Jersey court may consider a motion to terminate the registration requirements of an individual subject to Megan's Law[1] in New Jersey but residing in another state.  The court holds that although a New Jersey court may have jurisdiction to decide the motion, it must decide on a case-by-case basis whether the registrant has standing to bring the motion. 

          J.R. committed a sex offense in 1993 that subjected him to Megan's Law in New Jersey.  Upon moving to Montana in 2021, J.R. was subject to registration there because Montana statute requires registration for individuals who committed a sexual offense in another state for which they were required to register.  He then filed a motion to terminate his registration obligation in New Jersey pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(f).

          The court agrees with the Megan's Law judge that J.R. no longer had a registration obligation in New Jersey and his obligation in Montana was dependent on his prior conviction in New Jersey, which would remain regardless of the outcome of the motion.  The court rejects J.R.'s contention that he continued to have a Megan's Law "status" in New Jersey.  He neither faced harm from the denial of the motion nor could he benefit from the granting of the motion because it would not alter his registration obligation in Montana.  Because he was not suffering a harm that a New Jersey court could address, J.R. lacked standing to have a New Jersey court decide his motion, and we affirm the Megan's Law judge's decision.

          Because registration requirements vary across the country, there may be instances where a registrant's obligation to register in another jurisdiction would be impacted by the outcome of a motion to terminate in New Jersey.  Therefore, a court must examine the legislative scheme in the jurisdiction where the registrant resides to determine whether the motion presents a justiciable controversy that amounts to standing.

[1]  N.J.S.A. 2C:7-1 to -23.

In this matter, arising out of a failure to accommodate and discrimination action under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -50, a jury returned a verdict for plaintiff awarding her compensatory damages and $10 million in punitive damages.  On appeal, the court affirmed the finding of liability and the compensatory damage award but remanded for further proceedings on the amount of punitive damages, and specifically, for substantial consideration of the factors discussed by our Supreme Court in Baker v. National State Bank, 161 N.J. 220 (1999), and the United States Supreme Court in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996). 

The Supreme Court granted defendant's petition for certification and modified this court's remand instructions.  The Court held that when reviewing a punitive damages award against a public entity, a trial court must not only consider the Baker/BMW factors, but also needs to apply heightened scrutiny as required under Lockley v. State, Department of Corrections, 177 N.J. 413 (2003).

On remand, the trial court concluded the punitive damages award was "reasonable" and "comport[ed] with due process."

In the present appeal, the court established a hybrid standard of review when considering an award of punitive damages against a public entity.  The court should accord a deferential standard of review to a judge's determination of whether the jury's punitive damages award is "reasonable" and "justified in the circumstances of the case" under N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.14(a).  However, when a party challenges the punitive damages award on constitutional due process grounds, the court should review the trial court's decision as to the amount of the punitive damage award de novo. 

After considering the Baker/BMW factors using the heightened scrutiny required under Lockley, we concluded the punitive damages award was not unreasonable or disproportionate to the harm caused by defendant's upper management representatives in their disregard of the LAD.  Although mindful the source of the damages award is public funds, the court concluded the award was necessary to deter future unlawful conduct and to encourage high-level officials to conform their behavior.

        In this appeal, the court considers whether the Governor can be compelled by mandamus to act on an appointment power when the statute at issue neither expressly requires, nor provides a deadline for, the exercise of that discretionary function.  Seventeen municipalities challenge the Governor Murphy's inaction, demanding he fill long-standing vacancies on the Council on Affordable Housing (COAH).  The court rejects appellants' contentions that the Fair Housing Act (FHA), N.J.S.A. 52:27D-301 to -329, requires the chief of the executive branch to fill those appointments and that Governor Murphy's inaction violates that obligation and undermines the public policy reflected in the FHA. 

      Persuaded by the Governor's responding argument, this court held it cannot compel the Chief Executive to make appointments to COAH because mandamus – the relief appellants seek – cannot be applied against the Governor, generally.  Further, even if mandamus were applicable to the Governor, the remedy is unavailable here because appellants seek to compel an exercise of discretion.   The court thus held the Governor cannot be compelled by mandamus to fill COAH's vacancies.  Accordingly, the court dismissed the appeal.

         Following a long-term marriage, plaintiff filed a complaint for divorce and the parties, represented by counsel, entered a comprehensive marital settlement agreement (MSA).  Plaintiff sought an uncontested divorce "on the papers" and filed the certification required by the Administrative Office of the Courts for such a proceeding.  However, defendant sought an uncontested divorce hearing by way of Zoom, which the court in turn scheduled.  Plaintiff died before the uncontested hearing.

         His estate, represented by the parties' eldest son, sought to be named the real party in interest and to enforce the MSA, among other relief.  Defendant cross-moved to dismiss the complaint because of plaintiff's death.  The trial judge denied the motion and dismissed the complaint.  It ruled that under Carr v. Carr, 120 N.J. 336 (1990), plaintiff's death abated the divorce and there were no unusual or exceptional circumstances warranting invocation of an equitable remedy, such as a constructive trust, to prevent an unjust enrichment by defendant. 

         The court reversed and remanded for entry of an order permitting the estate to be substituted as the real party in interest and incorporating the MSA into a final judgment.  Although defendant did not engage in conduct warranting the imposition of a constructive trust, the trial court overlooked the fact the parties had a fully signed MSA that was fair and equitable, whose validity defendant did not challenge, and that but for the delay in scheduling the uncontested hearing, both parties intended to proceed with the uncontested divorce.  Therefore, the equities and our public policy of encouraging and enforcing settlements in matrimonial matters did not warrant discarding the MSA and dismissing the matter. 

          While the appeal was pending, the Legislature amended the intestacy and equitable distribution statutes.  The amendments to the equitable distribution statute authorize Family Part judges to effectuate equitable distribution where a party dies during a divorce proceeding and the complaint has not been previously dismissed pursuant to Rule 4:6-2.  The Legislation is effective January 8, 2024. 

        The court reviewed the plain language of the new statutes and the legislative statement accompanying their passage, and concluded the Legislature intended to afford pipeline retroactivity to pending cases.  Therefore, the new statutes applied to this case and provided independent grounds to uphold and enforce the parties' MSA.

This interlocutory appeal concerns whether the New Jersey courts have personal jurisdiction over a defendant Utah company and its sole owner who entered into a contract to reserve a booth for plaintiff, a New Jersey company, at a biannual trade show in Germany planned for 2020.  The 2020 trade show was eventually cancelled because of the COVID-19 pandemic, and the company and its owner declined to refund plaintiff's payment or apply it to the next show in 2022.

Defendants argue they lacked the required "minimum contacts" to be sued in New Jersey, stressing that plaintiff originally initiated the parties' relationship in 2011 by asking defendants to arrange for space at an earlier trade show in 2012.  They further contend it would offend constitutional principles of fair play and substantial justice to compel them to litigate this civil case in this distant state.

The court affirms the motion judge's finding of personal jurisdiction.  Although cases that have found specific jurisdiction often have involved a defendant that first initiated contact with a plaintiff in the forum state, the court holds it is not dispositive that the New Jersey plaintiff originally initiated contact with the Utah company and its owner years before the present transaction.  The record shows the Utah defendants sought and procured renewal contracts with plaintiff for the next four biannual trade shows, including 2020.  In addition, the Utah defendants repeatedly solicited new or renewal business from at least ten other New Jersey pet company exhibitors during that time frame.

Given that conduct, the Utah defendants "purposely availed" themselves of doing business with New Jersey customers to a level sufficient to satisfy the criteria for in personam jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause.

In addition, the norms of fair play and substantial justice are not offended here.  Defendants could have included a forum selection clause in their form contract but failed to do so.  The parties have already taken depositions remotely, and defendants can request the trial court—in this modest non-jury case with few witnesses—to consider in its discretion allowing them to appear remotely at trial.

     After Hurricane Sandy struck New Jersey in October 2012, high water levels flooded several communities, causing extensive damage to infrastructure.  After the floodwaters receded, municipalities and businesses worked with their electric utility, Jersey Central Power & Light (JCP&L), to restore power on the boardwalk for the spring 2013 tourist season.  After being notified that required repairs had been completed and municipal inspectors had approved the repair work, JCP&L restored power to the boardwalk in May 2013.  Months later, a fire broke out, causing severe damage to boardwalk businesses.  After an investigation revealed that the source of the fire was likely malfunctioning electrical equipment which had been submerged beneath the boardwalk during the storm, multiple plaintiffs sued for damages, alleging negligence by various parties, including JCP&L. 

     Defendant JCP&L moved for summary judgment and the trial court granted it, finding plaintiffs' expert issued a net opinion on the question of JCP&L's duty to inspect customer owned electrical equipment.  The trial court next found plaintiffs failed to make any showing on the question of duty, warranting summary judgment.

     Plaintiffs appealed, contending the trial court erred by barring the expert's opinion and granting summary judgment dismissing plaintiffs' various theories which supported the proposition that there is an existing duty on the part of JCP&L to inspect customer owned and maintained equipment.  Plaintiffs further argued that if such a duty did not already exist, the severe nature of the superstorm and the JCP&L's "knowledge" that an electrical inspection may have been negligently performed at the fire origin site, supported the imposition of an enhanced duty to re-inspect the work of state-licensed municipal inspectors before restoring power.

     The court held that:  the trial court engaged in a proper exercise of discretion when it barred plaintiffs' expert testimony; public utility JCP&L had no duty to inspect the privately-owned electrical equipment of a commercial businesses as a pre-condition to restoring power.  The court therefore affirmed the trial court's order.

In this case of first impression, the court addressed the disclosure of a body worn camera (BWC) video statement recorded pursuant to the Body Worn Camera Law (BWCL), N.J.S.A. 40A:14-118.3 to -118.5, under the Open Public Records Act (OPRA), N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1 to -13, and the common law right of access. The recorded statement was made by a father, a plaintiff in the action, who had alleged sexual misconduct perpetrated against his special needs minor son by a relative. Law enforcement determined there was insufficient probable cause to charge.
The court concluded plaintiffs' argument that the BWCL's exemption provision, N.J.S.A. 40A:14-118.5(l), abrogates OPRA's exemptions was without merit. The court further concluded OPRA's exemption, N.J.S.A. 47:1A-9(b), applied to preclude disclosure of the BWC recording because our case law has long-established that information received by law enforcement regarding an individual who was not arrested or charged is confidential and not subject to disclosure. See N. Jersey Media Grp., Inc. v. Bergen Cnty. Prosecutor's Off., 447 N.J. Super. 182, 204 (App. Div. 2016). A review of the plain language of the BWCL's inspection provision, N.J.S.A. 40A:14-118.5(k), which provides that a review of a BWC recording is subject to OPRA, demonstrated the four exemptions listed in N.J.S.A. 40A:14-118.5(l) are in addition to OPRA's exemptions. Further, reading OPRA in pari materia with the BWCL demonstrated the Legislature did not intend to preclude the application of OPRA's exemptions to BWC recordings.
The court further rejected plaintiffs' argument they were entitled to the BWC recording under the common law right of access. The court concluded the common law right of access did not compel release of the BWC recording because under the balancing of interests factors established by the Supreme Court in Loigman v. Kimmelman, 102 N.J. 98, 113 (1986), law enforcement's and the individual's interests in confidentiality outweigh the public's and plaintiffs' interests in disclosure.
Therefore, the court affirmed the judge's order that plaintiffs were not entitled to disclosure of the BWC recording under either OPRA or the common law right of access.

This matter presents a question of first impression concerning the rights and responsibilities of New Jersey gun permit applicants under the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution as recently interpreted by the United States Supreme Court in N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Assoc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. __, 142 S. Ct. 2111 (2022).    Petitioner appeals the denial of his application for a Firearms Purchaser Identification Card (FPIC) and a permit to purchase a handgun (PPH).  He raises several contentions, including a challenge to the constitutionality of a statute that requires denial of an FPIC/PPH application if it includes any knowingly false information, N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c). 

Bruen adopted a new test for resolving Second Amendment challenges, requiring modern regulations be consistent with this Nation's tradition of firearms regulation as shown by a well-established and representative historical analogue.  The court upholds the constitutionality of the falsification disqualification provision even though there appears to be no historical analogue for it.  Bruen acknowledged the constitutionality of "shall-issue" licensing regimes, which require gun permit applicants to file an application that prompts a background check.  Truthfulness on an application is an integral part of the background investigation process acknowledged in Bruen.  The falsification disqualifier safeguards the integrity of the licensing system without imposing additional substantive limits on who can purchase a firearm. 

The court further notes the plain text of the Second Amendment does not cover lying on an application form.  Because that conduct is not protected by the Second Amendment, the court concludes its regulation is not subject to the new "analogical" paradigm. 

The court also rejects petitioner's contention the falsification disqualifier applies only to material falsehoods.  Relatedly, the court rejects petitioner's contention the falsification disqualifier does not apply in this case because he retracted the false statement in his application during the Law Division hearing.  Petitioner's admission at the hearing that he had, in fact, been treated by a psychiatrist came too late, precluding the licensing authority from conducting a follow-up investigation before the hearing. 

Because the falsification disqualification provision categorically requires denial of petitioner's application, the court chooses not to address petitioner's facial and as-applied challenges to the trial court's alternative determination that issuance of an FPIC and PPH "would not be in the interest of public health, safety or welfare" under N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)(5).

In this appeal, the court addressed the novel issue of whether N.J.S.A. 18A:16-6 allows school board employees to wait until the final disposition of a civil or administrative action filed against them before seeking defense costs and indemnification from a school board.  The court concluded an employee cannot wait until the action is completed and must provide the school board with reasonable notice after the initiation of the proceeding.  The court observed the procedure under N.J.S.A. 18A:16-6.1 is distinguishable, which provides that an employee cannot seek reimbursement of defense costs and indemnification until the conclusion of a criminal or quasi-criminal action. 

Petitioners sought reimbursement of attorney fees and costs from the Trenton Board of Education following the favorable resolution of an administrative action against vice principal, Maria Azzaro, stemming from alleged improper grading practices and other improprieties.  The court affirmed the Commissioner of Education's final agency decision denying petitioners' request and held that bringing an action under N.J.S.A. 18A:16-6 twelve years after the initiation of an administrative action was not reasonable under the facts of the case.

These two consolidated appeals by codefendant brothers in an armed robbery case concern a surveillance video recorded at the crime scene.  The key approximately six-second portion of the video shows three men, two of whom were allegedly armed, escorting the victim behind a deli moments before he was robbed.  The State contended the culprits in the video were the two brothers and their father.  The video was played without objection during the trial and the State's closing argument.

During its deliberations, the jury requested that the video be shown again multiple times, in slow motion and with pauses.  Over defense counsel's objection, the trial judge granted the jury's requests, and the videos were replayed in the courtroom under the judge's supervision.  On appeal, defendants argue the slow-motion video replays were unduly prejudicial, citing research showing that such slow-motion replays can increase juror perceptions of an actor's intentionality.

In this opinion of first impression, the court holds that, subject to offsetting concerns of undue prejudice, surveillance video footage may be presented to jurors during a trial and in summation in slow motion or at other varying speeds, or with intermittent pauses, if the trial court in its discretion reasonably finds those modes of presentation would assist the jurors' understanding of the pertinent events and help them resolve disputed factual issues.

The courts further holds—again subject to offsetting concerns of undue prejudice—that trial judges in their discretion may grant a jury's requests during deliberations to replay the videos in such modes one or more times, provided that the playbacks occur in open court under the judge's supervision and in the presence of counsel.

Going forward, the court offers several non-exclusive factors to assist judges when considering whether to allow surveillance videos to be shown in varying speeds or with intermittent pauses during the trial and summations, and on a jury's request during deliberations.  The court further recommends that the Model Criminal Jury Charge Committee consider crafting an instruction to guide jurors when surveillance videos are presented in such modes.

Other issues raised on appeal are addressed in the unpublished portion of this opinion.

In this medical malpractice action, plaintiff, as administratrix ad prosequendum for the estate of decedent, sued a nursing facility and a hospital alleging negligent care that resulted in pressure wounds and, ultimately, decedent's physical decline and death.  Plaintiff asserted direct claims of administrative negligence against both facilities as well as claims based on vicarious liability for nursing malpractice.  Plaintiff served a single affidavit of merit ("AOM") executed by a registered nurse who opined that the nursing home, the hospital, and members of their nursing and nursing administrative staff deviated from the applicable standards of care.  The AOM did not distinguish between the nursing staffs at the separate facilities and did not name any individual nurses.

The trial court conducted two Ferreira conferences.  Defendants objected to the AOM because the nurse who executed it was not qualified to render an opinion as to direct administrative negligence claims against the facilities and the AOM did not identify any individual nurses for whom the facilities could be held vicariously liable.  Plaintiff did not seek to conduct any pre-AOM discovery and declined the opportunity to serve a supplemental AOM.  Defendants moved to dismiss for failure to serve an appropriate AOM, and the trial court dismissed the complaint on that basis.  Plaintiff subsequently settled her claims against the hospital.  On appeal, plaintiff abandoned her direct administrative negligence claim against the nursing home and proceeded based only on vicarious liability.

The court affirmed, concluding the AOM was not sufficient to support plaintiff's vicarious liability claim because it indiscriminately combined the nursing staffs of two separate facilities and did not identify any individual nurses.  The court also concluded plaintiff's claim was in essence an administrative negligence claim because it was based on the nursing home's systemic failure to provide adequate care rather than a claim based on the negligence of any individual nurses.

         In this appeal, the court considers whether a non-resident, religious organization is subject to personal jurisdiction in New Jersey related to allegations of sexual abuse of a child in New Jersey by a priest of the religious organization.  Plaintiff D.T. alleges that Michael McCarthy, a former Catholic priest, sexually abused him in New Jersey in 1971.  At that time, plaintiff was fourteen years old, and McCarthy was serving as a priest and teacher in the Archdiocese of Philadelphia (the Archdiocese).  Plaintiff appeals from an order dismissing his claims against the Archdiocese for lack of personal jurisdiction.  Because there are no facts establishing that the Archdiocese purposefully availed itself of any benefits in or from New Jersey related to McCarthy's alleged abuse of plaintiff, the court affirms.

In this appeal, the court considers whether a non-resident, religious organization is subject to personal jurisdiction in New Jersey related to allegations of sexual abuse of a child in New Jersey by a priest of the religious organization.  Plaintiff alleges that Father John Butler, a Catholic priest, sexually abused him from approximately 1995 to 1998, when plaintiff was approximately nine to twelve years old.  At that time, Butler was serving as a priest in New Jersey, and the Diocese of Richmond, Virginia (Richmond) had encouraged and allowed Butler to go to New Jersey to serve as a priest, knowing that Butler had sexual propensities towards children.

Richmond appeals from an order finding that it was subject to specific personal jurisdiction in New Jersey related to Butler's actions in New Jersey.  Because the facts establish that Richmond purposefully availed itself of the benefits of allowing Butler to go to New Jersey to serve as a priest, the court holds that there is specific personal jurisdiction over Richmond and affirms.